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Expert Systems and AI-Based Decision Support
in Auditing: Progress and Perspectives
†
William E. McCarthy
Michigan State University

Eric Denna
Brigham Young University

Graham Gal
University of Massachusetts
When all the AI rhetoric is boiled away, expert systems are simply com
puter programs much like general ledger packages or even like video
games. Writing a new payroll program in COBOL is not research, and
neither is building another auditing expert system.

1. Introduction
Since the development of AUDITOR at Illinois, there have been a number of auditing expert systems designed and built by both academics and accounting professionals. For surveys of this work, see Messier and Hansen
[1987], Gal and Steinbart [1987], Bailey, Hackenbrack, De, and Dillard [1987],
and Bailey, Graham, and Hansen [1988]. However, as encapsulated by the
statement above, a continuing criticism of this work (indeed, a criticism of
any knowledge-based work in accounting) is that it constitutes more development than research. In this paper, we contend that such blanket criticisms
are unfounded and are in fact more attributable to a critic's lack of schooling
in computer science than to any conceptual shortcomings in the actual systems research methods. More specifically, we will look at several auditing
expert systems and evaluate them in terms of some informally developed differentiation heuristics, heuristics whose rationale depends heavily on the work
of March [1988] and Cohen and Howe [1988]. We will also try to chart new
directions for research in knowledge-based auditing systems. Our central purpose throughout this paper is to try to develop aframework of analysis so
that when someone proposes a new audit expert system or enhancements
to an existing audit expert system, we can type its contribution as either primarily research or primarily development or both.
†Support in the development and preparation of this paper was provided by the Department of
Accounting at Michigan State University and Arthur Andersen & Co. Steve Rockwell provided
numerous comments and criticisms.
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The organization of the paper is as follows. Section two will explore the
cognitive modeling rationale for Al-based research in auditing. This reasoning is critical to our analysis framework, but it has been explicated in detail
elsewhere. It will only be reviewed and summarized here. Section three will
explore the software engineering legitimacy of knowledge-based audit systems, i.e., a rationale that is quite a bit different from the cognitive modeling
approach of most accounting researchers. This section will explore that rationale as adapted from aframework developed by March [1988] and augmented by other considerations gleanedfrom the work of researchers such
as Cohen and Howe [1988]. The three subsections of this software engineering
segment will address in order: (a) the Marchframework, (b) a set of arguments concerning domain specificity and maturity of the researchfield, and
(c) some considerations involved in deciding whether to build an entire system or to prototype just a part of it. Section four will explore time-lined development of four academic audit expert systems and contrast their research
content with that of three bogus projects. The rationale developed previously in both sections two and three will be used in the comparison of these
four real systems and three straw men. Sectionfive will explore the perspective
of the audit practitioners in AI tool development, and it will examine briefly
areas where academics and practitioners can work together. Section six will
finish the paper with a summary of our arguments.

2. Cognitive Modeling Rationale
A central theme which underlies the discipline of accounting is the belief that accounting information influences decision making processes. This
orientation has led both academicians and practitioners to be concerned
with improving decisions that fall within the accounting domain. There are
basically three different approaches that can be used to improve a decision.
Thefirst is to provide better information. A second is to train the decision
maker to use the current information set more effectively. Finally, the decision maker can be replaced with a device that produces a consistent decision
according to some prescribed model [Libby, 1981]. An initial issue that must
be resolved prior to taking any of these actions is to understand the current
approach used to make the decision in question so that deficiencies, if they
exist, can be evaluated. As a group, the decisions made by auditors have been
used as the primary focus of a number of projects as accounting researchers
seek to understand the auditing decision process. In recent years, the information-processing paradigm has been used in an increasing number of these
projects as researchers seek to uncover different aspects of the auditing decision process.
When auditors make a decision concerning the state of internal controls
or the importance of a particular account balance to the completed financial
statements, they must collect information, combine it using some process,
and thenfinally produce a decision. The information-processing paradigm offers a number of different approaches to investigate these activities. A researcher can ask auditors to verbalize what they are doing as they make
decisions. These verbal reports [Ericsson and Simon, 1980] provide a trace
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of the steps that the auditor goes through and thus give insights into the information used, the combination processes employed, and the decisions produced. This verbal trace of problem solving activities becomes a model of the
underlying cognitive process. A difficulty with this approach is that it is hard
to verify the model. This deficiency has led certain accounting researchers
to use tools and methods borrowedfrom computer science in an attempt to
implement the model of the auditor on a computer in the form of a program
that simulates the auditor's decision process. The rationale for building these
systems is that the researcher now has a program which contains a cognitive model of the decision maker and can proceed with an assessment of which
of the three approaches mentioned above would be appropriate to improve
the decision. That is, should we change the information or should we train
auditors to use a different process orfinally should we use the expert system
to replace the auditor?
As noted by Bailey et al. [1987], cognitive modeling has certainly provided
the dominant justification for most expert systems work in auditing, and it is
the rationale most easily accepted by mainstream accounting researchers.
We turn now to a less well-known (in accounting) justification for construction and use of AI tools in this area: the software engineering rationale.

3. Software Engineering Rationale
In describing the scope of empirical AI (as opposed to applied AI) endeavors
and in contrasting its methodological differences with those of traditional behavioral science, Cohen and Howe observe that: "Whereas... much research
in the behavioral sciences is concerned with teasing apart the components
of behavior and their causal interrelationships, empirical AI is concerned with
putting those components together in one box to produce behavior" [1988,
p. 18]. These researchers go on to say that the task of empirical AI researchers "is not tofind out [by statistical induction] how the average human
organism (or organization) works; but rather to build artificial systems that
work in particular ways" [p. 19]. By building such systems in carefully delineated ways, they contend that we can produce useful generalizations deduciblefrom explanations of AI theory. Cohen and Howe's thoughts in this
regard echo sentiments expressed a number of years earlier by Newell and
Simon [1976, p. 126] who contended that the purpose of AI research was to
enrich our collective store of concrete experiences with specific classes of
symbolic processing systems and to use that collective store to reason across
domains about the general characteristics of intelligence and its methods
of implementation.
Justifications such as these form the basis for what we call the software
engineering rationale for AI research in accounting and auditing. Stated differently, we believe that efforts aimed at building knowledge-based systems
in new and innovative ways in previously unexplored task areas can quite legitimately be viewed as research even if the results of such efforts do not strongly
mimic the behavior of a human expert in that particular domain. In the subsections that follow, we explore different heuristicframeworks that can be used
to classify endeavors in this vein as either research or development.
61

The March Framework
In a speech given at ICIS-88, Sal March (the present editor of Computing
Surveys) outlined his framework for identifying information technology issues
for information systems researchers. Thatframework is reproduced in Figure 1, and his explanation is given below [March, 1988]:
My generalframework for research in information technology is
two dimensional. Thefirst dimension is an engineering paradigm: build
an artifact to perform a particular task, evaluate the performance of
that artifact (develop performance measures and collect data to evaluate those measures), and prove the performance of the artifact (superior to another tool or optimal in some sense). The second dimension
is a problem solving (methodological) paradigm: representation of the
problem within its domain, development of methods utilizing the representation to solve the problem, and tools to instantiate the method.
In order to build a tool to solve a problem, a representation of the
problem must be developed along with a solution method to instantiate. The building of tools based on given problem representations and
methods typically does not qualify as research unless it is the first tool
to be developed, in which case the research question is feasibility: can
the representation and method be instantiated into a viable tool?
Similarly, for building representations and methods, the research
issues involve building new or substantially different representations
and methods. Simply being "different" or "novel" may classify work
as "research" (depending on how novel it is), however, the burden is
normally on the researcher to demonstrate that the new representation or method is "better" than existing ones. The evaluate and prove
columns of theframework addresses this issue.
To adequately evaluate representations, methods, or tools, the researcher must develop measures of performance. These must address
the key issues of the problem domain and the solution approach. The
researcher then evaluates these measures for various representations,
methods, and tools to provide a performance comparison. This type of
work is typically empirical. It develops case by case comparisons until
the discipline has decided upon a standard set of measures.
Given a standard set of evaluation criteria, research can then proceed to prove the quality of representations, methods, and tools.
Proofs may be in the form of "optimality" of the solution or superiority of the representation, method, or tool (where the evaluation measures define the optimization or comparison criteria).
If we apply the Marchframework and explanation to proposed new work
in knowledge-based audit systems, they give us strong guidelines for differentiating researchfrom development or empirical AIfrom applied AI. As he
infers, building a new tool for a task isn't really research unless the methods
or representations change substantially or unless the researcher can demonstrate performance on well-developed evaluation metrics. For an audit researcher today, novel representations might include new structures (such as
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FIGURE 1
THE MARCH FRAMEWORK
SOURCE: MARCH (1988)
advanced forms of semantic networks [Winston, 1984]) and new problemsolving architectures (such as heuristic classification [Clancey, 1985]). Novel
methods might encompass the use of new learning algorithms or the discovery
of innovative knowledge acquisition techniques. Moving across to the evaluate and prove columns would mean building new systems that are demonstrably better on tasks such as causal explanations or default reasoning.
Domain Specificity and Maturity of the Research Field
According to the Marchframework, building a new tool with established
representations and methods teeters on the research-development fence unless one is clearly thefirst person to do something in the area. We believe
that judgments of novelty in this arena can be clarified by considering both
the domain specificity of the new effort and the maturity of the particular research field (or sub-field) in which that effort's exposition is to take place.
These considerations are discussed below.
Specificity and maturity considerations are illustrated with hierarchies in
Figure 2 whose roots are very general and whose leaves are audit procedures
specialized down to the task andfirm level. As with all research, the more
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SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM AKRESH ET AL. (1988)

FIGURE 2 -- DOMAIN SPECIFICITY AND MATURITY

general one's conclusions are, the better; so staying up in the tree is desirable. In the three-dimensional plane of thisfigure, we have illustrated the age
of the research sub-field. Our point in accounting for time variability is that
we believe that the proper set of research activities changes as afield matures. What is acceptable in an emerging area as exploratory research will
often be deemed far less noteworthy as cumulative results dictate new directions.
For the proposer of a new audit expert system today, these time sequenced hierarchies carry some important considerations. For instance, just
finding an unexplored node and building a tool which uses established representations and methods is clearly not innovative enough unless the task is
at a sufficiently high level of generality to warrant reassessment of the lessons
learnedfrom building entire classes of previous systems. In a like manner,
exploratory programming of a new niche or sub-tree becomes less innovative as time goes on because March's research question of feasibility has been
resolved. In both of these cases, the systems efforts being proposed would
fall under the headings of development or applied AI.
Research and Development Delineation in Prototype Systems
A fully functional expert system involves considerably more development
effort than research effort, and designers willfind that the new knowledge
gainedfrom building system components will decrease dramatically as the
project progresses. Actually, prototyping to a proof of feasibility is the essence
of research in AI tools, a fact illustrated by McCarthy, Rockwell, and Wallingford [1989] in their task complexity hierarchy of Figure 3.
When a new AI system is proposed, assessing its ultimate feasibility involves the following:
a. breaking the operation of the entire new system into its component
procedures and arranging those components into a structured hierarchy like Figure 3,
b. assessing the relative implementation difficulty of the top level
components and choosing the most complex module for further investigation,
c. implementing a prototype of that chosen module down to its full depth
of complexity, and
d. assessing overall feasibility by combining estimates of both width
and depth of effort from the preliminary structuring of the overall
task andfrom the results of the prototyping efforts.
Empirical AI (research) would stop at this proof of feasibility unless there
was clear evidence that further overall complexity (unrelated to individual
module complexity/simplicity) might be introduced by full implementation
of factors such as scaling problems. Applied AI (development) on the other
hand would continue with implementation of the other components. Little new
knowledge would be revealed by the development efforts, but the entire project would move closer to actual practical use in a cost-beneficial way.
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[Source: Adapted from McCarthy, Rockwell, and Wallingford (1989)]
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FIGURE 3
PROTOTYPE MODULE STRUCTURE
Summary of Software Engineering Rationale
In their famous Turing Award Lecture of 1975, Newell and Simon [1976,
p.114] spoke of the confusion surrounding the scope of basic research in computer science:
Computer science is an empirical discipline.... Each new program
that is built is an experiment. It poses a question to nature, and its behavior offers clues to an answer. Neither machines nor programs are
black boxes: they are artifacts that have been designed, both hardware
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and software, and we can open them up and look inside. We can relate their structure to their behavior and draw many lessonsfrom a
single experiment.... We build computers and programs for many reasons. We build them to serve society and as tools for carrying out the
economic tasks of society. But as basic scientists, we build machines
and programs as a way of discovering new phenomena and analyzing
phenomena we already know about. Society often becomes confused
about this, believing that computers and programs are to be constructed only for the economic use that can be made of them (or as
intermediate items in a developmental sequence leading to such use).
It needs to understand that the phenomena surrounding computers
are deep and obscure, requiring much experimentation to assess their
nature. It needs to understand that, as in any science, the gains that
accruefrom such experimentation and understanding pay off in the
permanent acquisition of new techniques; and that it is these techniques
that will create the instruments to help society in achieving its goals.
Newell and Simon summarize well our viewpoint about AI research in accountingfrom a software engineering perspective. Building new software systems that operate in innovative ways and that provide new insight constitutes
significant research activity as does the process of creating or applying new
methodologies, representations, and methods that facilitate the construction of such novel software systems. Computer software in general and, AI
programming in particular, can legitimately be defended as the end goal of
accounting research, not just as a means to some other end such as the test
of a certain behavioral or economic theory.

4. Some Research/Development Examples
In the previous two sections of the paper, we have outlined in preliminary
fashion some heuristicframeworks which can be used to assess the research
content of a proposed Al-based audit tool. In this section, we will demonstrate
the use of thoseframeworks in exploring the time- lined development of four
academic audit expert systems. We intend also to highlight their evaluation
by contrasting their research content with three bogus expert systems. We
have tentatively designated these bogus systems as YAK-BATs (Yet Another
Knowledge-Based Auditing Tool), and they serve as prime straw men for our
research/development differentiation arguments.
Our example audit systems are displayed in the box in Figure 4 that portrays empirical AI systems as bubbling up and above the dotted line separating research and development and applied AI systems as gravitating down.
The four real systems are AUDITOR [Dungan and Chandler, 1985], AUDITPLANNER [Steinbart, 1987], GC-X [Selfridge and Biggs, 1988], and IRE [Peters, 1989]. The three bogus systems are YAK-BAT-1, YAK-BAT-2, and
YAK-BAT- 3; and we have positioned these straw men at particular time intervals purposely to highlight the types of proposed work properly classified
as development. General features of each system are given in order below.
AUDITOR: This was a simple rule-based system that used a linear weighting system to assess the adequacy of a client's allowance for bad debts. It was
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FIGURE 4
ACADEMIC SYSTEMS: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

thefirst publicized application of knowledge-based methods and representations to the domain of auditing, and it was certainly a pioneering research
effort. The system was developed and validated with a set of working auditors.
YAKBAT-1: At the nascent stage of the audit expert systemfield in 198485, it would be hard to think of a proposed project which would not have shed
some new light of knowledge on the area. However, if someone had proposed
to use a known development shell on a fairly low level task using wellunderstood methods of knowledge acquisition, we would consider that as
sinking below the R&D surface. This would be especially true if there was
no attempt made at emulation of an acknowledged expert and/or validation.
In those cases, the developer would simply have been using the technology
for automation of ad hoc decision-making heuristics.
AUDIT-PLANNER: This was a rule-based system with a much more complex control structure than AUDITOR. AUDIT-PLANNER was truly a cognitive model of one individual's expertise in the area of materiality judgments,
so its research contribution is unquestioned. It was validated with subordinate auditors of the samefirm. The representations and methods used in building the system were well known, but the task was fairly high on the domain
hierarchy.
YAKBAT-2: Steinbart's system circumscribed the entire materiality decision very well, and it was essentially self-contained in the sense that a consultation with AUDIT-PLANNER elicited a set of environmental cues from a
user and used those cues in its goal of producing a materiality judgment. A
tool developed later that would have concentrated heavily on the less complex development branches (such as tuning the user interface) or that would
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have used the same rule-oriented representations to emulate a lower level
audit task would fall into the development or applied AI compartment.
GC-X: The Selfridge and Biggs going concern expert system introduced
the complex representations of semantic networks. They also demonstrated
the complicated interactions between audit task knowledge and client domain
knowledge that had long been thought to be an important ingredient of audit
expertise.
YAK-BAT-3: This might be a frame-based or rule-based expert system which
would lack the domain richness of GC-X. Certainly at this point in time, simple implementations of somewhat specific judgment tasks would lend little
new insight to thefield, unless the tool could be moved over to the evaluation or prove columns of the March framework.
IRE: The Inherent Risk Evaluator used complex representations of both
firm specific and general business knowledge along with specific predictions
derived from analytical review rules to assess risk for audit planning. The system was validated carefully on three sets of case data, and its cognitive modeling intent is quite clear.
The research viability of each real system discussed above is widely (but
not universally) acknowledged in the auditing community. Their developers
undoubtedly would cast themfirst as cognitive models, but they all display
innovation in a software development sense also. Certainly, researchers
would be wise to concentrate on the more widely accepted behavioral science
rationale in their development of proposed new projects. We remain convinced
however that the technology-oriented rationale of the prior section constitutes
an additional basis on which to plan new work.

5. The Accounting Firm Perspective
As has been explained, research efforts concentrate on pursuing more
accurate representations or models of cognitive processes while improving
the methods for evaluating the representation methods themselves. Therefore, academic efforts focusing on the particular use of previously explored
frameworks are best characterized as development rather than research
given our discussion to this point.
Unlike academic researchers, professional firms tend not to be concerned
about whether a particular project is characterized as research or development. Rather, firms focus primarily on enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of audit practice instead of understanding low level cognitive
processes, exploring complex instances of judgement, or developing formal
methods of evaluating concepts. This interest typically results in accounting
firms applying artificial intelligence technology along two fronts: (1) automating clerical or low level audit judgement tasks and (2) leveraging firm
or individual expertise.
Notwithstanding the profession's disinterest in distinguishing between
research and development, these projects often result in significant contributions to academic research efforts. Graphically, the results of AI work
amongst thefirms might be characterized as shown in Figure 5. Although
the major portion of a particularfirm project will likely be characterized as
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FIGURE 5
ACCOUNTING FIRM SYSTEMS;
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
development, a portion of the effort could legitimately be considered a research contribution.
The Contribution of Practice to AI Research
In a nutshell, we see practice efforts providing two contributions to AI research. First, the firms may propose and utilize novel methods and representations as well as provide well- developed metrics for evaluation of those
methods and representations; and second, they expose the weaknesses of
scalability of academic theories and ideas.
During the past few years, a number of firms have released various expert systems which are in use today. To a limited extent, some of these systems have provided a contribution to AI research by providing improved
representation and evaluation methods. For illustrative purposes, we will
briefly review the contribution of Coopers & Lybrand's new audit tool Risk
Advisor SM .
As Graham, Damens, and Van Ness [1990] explain, "Risk AdvisorSM is
an expert system based on the knowledge and experience of senior audit and
consulting professionals. It is used by auditors to enhance the risk assessment process through the systematic capture and analysis of a wide range
of financial information and other data to allow the timely identification of audit
and business issues." The system captures, analyzes, and reports information ranging from standard client, industry, and economy-widefinancial information to qualitative information captured through dialogue with the
system. The system is utilized during audit planning to identify and document
potential audit risks and management issues which are important to the
audit. Additionally, the system assists in analyzing whether appropriate action is taken in response to the issues raised by the system during the planning process.
Risk Advisor SM certainly provides useful contributions to the issues of
knowledge acquisition from more than one expert, knowledge representa70

tion, and human/computer interaction. However, we believe the larger contribution of projects such as these lie more in their ability to address the "toy
world" problems which have plagued academic efforts for years.
Although execution of a computational model serves a "proof of concept
or feasibility" which academics have used as their primary evaluation tool,
the proof is still susceptible to weaknesses of scalability such as those often
revealed by the overly simplistic application of exhaustive search methods.
Upon being tested in realistic decision support scenarios, the solutions offered by auditing academics sometimes prove insufficient for addressing
problems in the real world. As Waterman [1986, p. 27] states, "When gross
simplifying assumptions are made about a complex problem, and its data, the
resulting solution may not scale up to the point where it's applicable to the
real problem." Projects such as those by Coopers & Lybrand certainly provide a test of the scalability of academic theories and thereby result in feedback to the academic community as to the adequacy of academic research.
Practitioners and Academics Working Together The Optimal Solution
The primary contribution of academic researchers in anyfield is the low
cost application of analytical skills to problem solving. However, when academic efforts are isolated from the real world problems faced by practitioners, the usefulness of the research wanes. Conversely, practitioners face
real, complex, and important problems daily which can prove costly if not objectively studied in a timely fashion.
The logical conclusion to an analysis of academic and practice efforts in
the use of AI is that the two should work together. Such a consortium could
possibly result in significant enhancements to audit practice by providing sound
solutions to real problems which have been carefully scrutinized without the
pressure of the practice environment. To the extent that academics and practitioners can enhance audit practice while also increasing our understanding
of audit judgement, significant contributions can be expected.
The reality of the situation however, highlights significant challenges to
developing working relationships between practitioners and academics. The
strategic nature of AI projects tends to encourage confidentiality of project results at least in the short run while thefirm realizes the rewards of being the
"first-mover" with a new idea. Such a practice is diametrically opposite to the
nature of the academic environment which attempts to distribute project results in a much more timely fashion in order to encourage additional research.
Although differences are obvious, they are no greater than those faced
in many of the physical and engineering sciences in which universities and
organizations work together on more sensitive issues of national security as
opposed to simpler marketing or operational advantages. We believe that any
challenges can be overcome once practitioners and academics recognize
the mutual benefit of working together.

6. Summary
This paper has reviewed the progress of knowledge-based research projects in auditing, primarily in the academic section of thefield. We outlined
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some heuristic rules and frameworks against which a proposed new audit tool
could be evaluated and classified as either fundamental research or practical development. We readily admit that certain types of expert systems are
like COBOL payroll programs in the sense that they are simple computational
exercises that add little to fundamental knowledge. Building software systems
which make marginal improvements with known approaches in established
domains is definitely development activity, while building software systems
which make significant improvements with novel approaches in unexplored
domains is most certainly research. The difficulty of classification lies in the
middle which is where we have concentrated our discussion. Academic researchers can follow our guidelines in trying to stay above the research-development surface.
We remain very optimistic that work in this particularfield will continue
to grow, along with knowledge-based research in other areas of accounting
as well. Expertise in professional judgment will always be a scarce commodity on both public and corporate accounting staffs, and AI research methods continue to offer promising avenues for both explanation and leveraging
of that expertise. The problems are interesting, the cognatefield (AI) set of
solutions and research methods continue to grow, and the auditing practice
imperative for efficiency and effectiveness remains high.
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